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Group Secret-Key Generation using Algebraic
Rings in Three-User Wireless Networks
Manish Rao and J. Harshan
Abstract
Physical-layer Group Secret-Key (GSK) generation is an effective way of synthesizing symmetric keys across
multiple nodes in wireless networks. Unlike the case of two-user key generation, GSK generation necessitates some
nodes to act as facilitators, which broadcast linear combinations of the channel realizations thereby assisting all the
nodes to witness the intended common source of randomness. However, in practice, radio devices are designed to
transmit symbols from finite complex constellations, and as a result, the channel realizations are typically quantized
by the facilitator which in turn impacts the overall secret-key rate. Identifying this issue, we propose a class of
GSK generation protocols, called Symmetrically Quantized GSK (SQGSK) protocols, in a network of three nodes.
In the proposed protocols, due to quantization of symbols at the facilitator, the other two nodes also quantize their
channel realizations, and use them appropriately to generate the keys. Under special conditions, we analytically
show that the SQGSK protocols provide higher key-rate than the baselines wherein only the facilitator quantizes
the channel realizations. We use extensive simulations to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed protocols when
the facilitator employs finite constellations such as 4-, 16-, and 64-QAM.
Index Terms
Physical-layer key generation, common source of randomness, security, wireless networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer key generation is an effective way of synthesizing symmetric keys for securing commu-
nication between wireless nodes. In the simplest model of two-node key generation, radio devices witness
correlated source of randomness by observing the temporal variation of the wireless channel between
them. A popular way to implement such an idea is to exchange pilot symbols (in time-division duplex
manner) within the coherence-interval thereby exploiting the channel reciprocity property [1]. This line
Manish Rao and J. Harshan are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India. Email:
manish.eee15@ee.iitd.ac.in, jharshan@ee.iitd.ac.in. Part of this work will appear in the proceedings of International Conference on Signal
Processing and Communications 2018 [25].
2Fig. 1. Network model of interest with three interconnected wireless nodes, which intend to generate a group secret key in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We assume pair-wise reciprocity in our model, i.e., hjk = hkj for k, j,∈ {1, 2, 3, E} such that k 6= j. All the
channels in the above model are assumed to be statistically independent.
of key generation has been well studied with various applications such as radio-frequency communication
and optical communication.
A generalization of two-node physical-layer key generation is group secret-key (GSK) generation
[20]-[21], wherein more than two nodes in the network generate a shared secret-key by observing an
appropriately chosen common source of randomness (CSR). One of the main questions in such a scenario
is “How to securely share the CSR among the nodes in the network?” To illustrate, in the case of the
three-node network shown in Fig. 1, the total set of available channels is {h12, h13, h23}, where hjk
denotes the complex baseband wireless channel between node-j and node-k. With this setup, the CSR
can be any non-empty subset of the available channels. Irrespective of the choice of the CSR, observe that
some nodes in the network have to learn the channel realizations of the adjacent pairs, and this cannot be
achieved by exchanging pilot symbols among them. For instance, if the CSR is h12, then node-3 cannot
learn this channel during the pilot transmission phase, and therefore either node-1 or node-2 (or both) has
(have) to help node-3 in learning h12. In general, an inherent property of physical-layer GSK generation
is that some channel realizations can be directly obtained using pilots, while some of them have to be
shared by special nodes, called facilitators. This implies that the facilitators need to transmit Gaussian
distributed complex numbers with infinite precision. However, in practice, radio devices are designed
to transmit baseband symbols from finite constellations. As a result, quantized versions of the channel
realizations have to be transmitted by the facilitators, and this leads to disparity in the noise levels of the
CSR observed at various nodes in the network. In this paper, we address this disparity and discuss new
methods to generate GSK by acknowledging the fact that the CSR at some nodes are more corrupted
than at others.
3A. Contributions
The main contributions of this work are listed below:
• We address physical-layer GSK generation among three nodes in a wireless network as shown in
Fig. 1. Particularly, we are interested in developing a practical GSK method, wherein the nodes have
the constraint of transmitting baseband symbols from finite complex constellations. We highlight that
this practical aspect of GSK generation has not been studied in the literature. In our framework of
practical GSK generation, the facilitators are restricted to quantize the channel realizations directly
to points in complex constellations such as quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). GSK protocols
wherein only the facilitators quantize the complex channel realizations are considered as baselines
to evaluate the contributions of this work, and those baselines are referred to as Asymmetrically
Quantized GSK (AQGSK) protocols. (See Section II and Section III).
• To address the constraints imposed on the facilitator, we propose a practical GSK protocol, referred
to as Symmetrically Quantized GSK (SQGSK), wherein due to the quantization of symbols at the
facilitator, the other two nodes also quantize their channel realizations, and use them appropriately
to generate keys. This forced-quantization at the other two nodes, although not necessary, will make
sure that the three nodes have common source of randomness with high correlation. We first give
an intuitive explanation on the benefits of SQGSK, and then information-theoretically prove its
advantages over the baseline under special conditions (See Section IV-C). Through simulations, we
show that SQGSK outperforms the baseline with at most 43%, 9% and 4% increase in key-rate,
when the facilitator employs 4-, 16- and 64-QAM to quantize the channel realizations, respectively
(See Section VI).
• To study the leakage aspects of the GSK protocol, we consider a passive eavesdropper model as
shown in Fig. 1, wherein the eavesdropper (represented as Eve) can perfectly recover the symbols
transmitted by each of the legitimate nodes. However, by the virtue of her geographical location, the
eavesdropper cannot learn the channels {h12, h13, h23} using the pilot symbols transmitted by the
legitimate nodes. We present leakage analysis of the CSR in the SQGSK protocol, and theoretically
prove that the residual entropy at an external eavesdropper is strictly less than the entropy of the CSR
(See Section IV-D). We show that SQGSK leaks 25% to 50% of the CSR depending on the size of
the constellation. To circumvent this limitation of the SQGSK protocol, we propose another practical
key generation protocol, referred to as the Algebraic SQGSK protocol (See Section V), wherein the
facilitator transmits a linear combination of the quantized versions of the channel realizations over
a suitable algebraic ring. Subsequently, we show that this algebraic result can be used by the other
nodes to witness a noisy version of the common source of randomness. Under special conditions,
4we theoretically prove that the key-rate offered by the Algebraic SQGSK protocol is higher than the
baseline (See Section V-C), and also prove that the Algebraic SQGSK protocol incurs zero leakage
of the CSR to an external eavesdropper (See Section V-D). Through simulations, we show that
Algebraic SQGSK outperforms the baseline with at most 230%, 57% and 24% increase in key-rate,
when the facilitator employs 4-, 16- and 64-QAM to quantize the channel realizations, respectively
(See Section VI).
• In the last part of this work, we propose a multi-level quantization algorithm in order to capitalize
on the discrete nature of the CSR in the SQGSK protocols. Through simulations, we show that
the multi-level quantization idea provides significant benefits in key-rates (74% with 16-QAM and
34% with 64-QAM) at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values when used in conjunction with the
Algebraic SQGSK protocol. (See Section VII)
B. Our Approach
When proposing practical protocols to synthesize GSKs, we analyze their key-rate by applying information-
theoretical results in no additive-noise scenario so as to capture the effect of quantization noise. For
instance, with reference to Fig. 1, if the channel realization h12 is chosen as the CSR, then node-1 and
node-2 observe r1 = h12 and r2 = h12, respectively (due to channel reciprocity), whereas node-3 observes
r3 = h12+z3 such that z3 captures the quantization noise introduced by the facilitator. In such a scenario,
the key-rate is information-theoretically determined by [12]
1
N
min(I(r1; r2), I(r1; r3), I(r2; r3)) =
1
N
min(H(h12), I(h12; h12 + z3)). (1)
where H(·) denotes the entropy operator, I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information operator, and N denotes
the number of channel-uses needed so that the three nodes witness the CSR. To analytically substantiate
the superiority of one GSK protocol over the other, we compare the mutual information expressions in (1)
in no additive-noise scenario, and supplement those results through extensive simulations in the presence
of additive noise. To showcase the effectiveness of the proposed protocols, we use them in conjunction
with the well known level-crossing algorithm [1], which is mainly used for reconciliation on the generated
secret bits. Due to space constraints, we omit a detailed description of the level-crossing algorithm and
refer to the readers to [1] for more details.
C. Related Work
Physical-layer key generation between two radio devices is well studied starting from theory, that focus
on fundamental limits [2], to test bed developments that showcase proof of concepts [3]. A wide range
of contributions exist in this topic, wherein the specific choice of common source of randomness [4], [5],
5[6], [7], [8], used to generate the keys depend on wireless platforms such as OFDM [9], multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems [10], and fibre optical networks [11], to name a few. Extending the
idea of key generation between two radio devices, some contributions have also studied models involving
third-party relay(s) to help generate secret-keys between nodes that are out of radio-frequency range.
Within this class, [13],[14] have focused on protocols for exchanging messages so as to (i) reduce the
latency, and (ii) to secure the generated keys from an external eavesdropper, while some have considered
honest-but-curious relays that help in the key generation process, but also are curious to listen to the
messages [15]. The latter framework focuses on designing protocols to generate keys via untrusted relays,
and yet minimize leakage of information to them [16], [17]. A generalization of relay-assisted secret-key
generation is the concept of wireless physical-layer group secret-key (GSK) generation, wherein a group
of nodes in a network generate a shared secret-key by observing a common source of randomness. For
GSK generation using pair-wise channels, we refer the readers to [18], [20], for key generation using
received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values, we refer the readers to [19], [21], for group keys using
channel estimates, we refer to [22]. Although there is rich literature on physical-layer GSK generation
using RSSI values and channel estimates, questions on practicality of such approaches are missing. One
such practical aspect is the involvement of facilitators, which need to transmit quantized versions of the
channel realizations to other nodes in the network.
Notations: We use x ∼ CN(0, σ2) to represent a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable with mean 0 variance σ2. The set of all integers and Gaussian integers are denoted by Z and
Z[i], respectively, where i =
√−1. The set Zp, for some integer p > 1, is given by {0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
The mutual information between two random variables x and y is denoted by I(x; y), and H(x) denotes
the (differential) entropy of a (continuous) random variable x. The probability mass function (PMF) on
a discrete random variable x is denoted by P (x). Assuming that the realizations of a discrete random
variable x are ordered, we use xj to denote the j-th realization. Furthermore, the probability that a
discrete random variable x takes the value xj is denoted by Prob(x = xj). We denote the set of all
complex numbers by C. Given two sets S1 ⊂ C and S2 ⊂ C, the direct sum S1
⊕
S2 is given by
{s1 + s2 | s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}. The acronym AWGN refers to additive white Gaussian noise. The number
of elements in the set S is denoted by |S|.
II. GROUP SECRET KEY GENERATION
We consider a wireless network comprising three nodes, denoted by node-1, node-2 and node-3 as
shown in Fig. 1. In this network model, the channel between any two nodes is assumed to be frequency-
flat and remain quasi-static for a block of four channel-uses. The wireless channel between node-j and
6node-k, for j 6= k is represented by a complex Gaussian random variable hjk ∼ CN(0, 1). We assume
that the channels {h12, h13, h23} are statistically independent and exhibit pair-wise reciprocity within the
coherence-block, i.e., hjk = hkj for j 6= k. We also assume that all the nodes witness AWGN distributed
as CN(0, σ2). The three nodes intend to generate a GSK by observing a subset of the channel realizations
{h12, h13, h23}. This subset is referred to as the CSR in our model. To learn the CSR, the three nodes
broadcast the pilot symbols turn-by-turn within each coherence-block, using which the receiving nodes
learn the corresponding channel realizations. Subsequently, one of the nodes, referred to as the facilitator,
broadcasts a combination of its observed channel realizations to assist all the nodes in learning the CSR.
Consolidating the CSR observed over several coherence-blocks, the three nodes then apply a suitable key
generation algorithm to synthesize a GSK. We denote the channel realizations based on the coherence-
block index l for l = 1, 2, . . . , L, i.e.,H(l) = {h12(l), h13(l), h23(l)}. Note that the facilitator must transmit
the channel realizations in such a way to prevent leakage to an external eavesdropper. In the next section,
we present one such GSK protocol wherein the three nodes have to witness the CSR {h12(l), h13(l)}, for
1 ≤ l ≤ L.1
Fig. 2. A four-phase GSK protocol depicting exchange of pilot symbols and channel realizations among the three nodes. Using the above
protocol, the three nodes arrive at the common source of randomness {h12, h13}, using which secret keys are synthesized. In this protocol,
node-1 acts as the facilitator to help node-2 and node-3 in learning h13(l) and h12(l), respectively.
1It is straightforward to extend the considered GSK protocol to assist the users in witnessing {h12(l), h13(l), h23(l)} as the CSR. Since
we are interested in studying the quantization effects on the CSR, our choice of {h12(l), h13(l)} as the CSR serves the purpose.
7A. GSK protocol
We present a detailed description of the GSK protocol [23] as depicted in Fig. 2. Specifically, for a
given coherence-block l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, the protocol comprises of four phases, i.e., N = 4:
Phase 1: node-1 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-2 and node-3 to estimate the
channels h12(l) and h13(l), respectively, as
θ
(1)
2 (l) = h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l) and θ
(1)
3 (l) = h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l), (2)
where e
(1)
2 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) and e(1)3 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) denote the channel estimation errors at node-2 and
node-3, respectively. The superscripts denote the phase number in each coherence-block.
Phase 2: node-2 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-1 and node-3 to estimate the
channels h12(l) and h23(l), respectively, as
θ
(2)
1 (l) = h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l) and θ
(2)
3 (l) = h23(l) + e
(2)
3 (l), (3)
where e
(2)
1 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) and e(2)3 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) are the corresponding estimation errors.
Phase 3: node-3 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-1 and node-2 to estimate the
channels h13(l) and h23(l), respectively, as
θ
(3)
2 (l) = h23(l) + e
(3)
2 (l) and θ
(3)
1 (l) = h13(l) + e
(3)
1 (l), (4)
where e
(3)
2 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) and e(3)1 (l) ∼ CN(0, γ) are the corresponding estimation errors. We assume that
all the nodes employ the same channel estimation algorithm, and as a result, we use γ as the variance
of the estimation error at all the nodes.
Phase 4: By the end of Phase 3, the three nodes have noisy versions of a subset of the intended CSR
{h12(l), h13(l)}. Therefore, to fill the gap, in the last phase, node-1 (which acts as the facilitator) transmits
the sum θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l), using which node-2 and node-3 receive
θ
(4)
2 (l) = h12(l)
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)
)
+ n
(4)
2 (l), and
θ
(4)
3 (l) = h13(l)
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)
)
+ n
(4)
3 (l),
respectively, where n
(4)
2 (l) and n
(4)
3 (l) respectively denote the additive noise at node-2 and node-3
distributed as CN(0, σ2). Using θ
(1)
2 (l) and θ
(4)
2 (l), node-2 learns a noisy version of h13(l) by first applying
a zero-forcing equalizer, and then canceling the known channel realization as
θ¯
(4)
2 (l) =
((
θ
(1)
2 (l)
)−1
θ
(4)
2 (l)
)
− θ(1)2 (l). (5)
Similarly, using θ
(1)
3 (l) and θ
(4)
3 (l), node-3 learns a noisy version of h12(l) as
θ¯
(4)
3 (l) =
((
θ
(1)
3 (l)
)−1
θ
(4)
3 (l)
)
− θ(1)3 (l). (6)
8Thus, by the end of Phase 4, the three nodes witness noisy versions of the CSR {h12(l), h13(l)}.
Observe that all the nodes witness noisy version of the CSR, wherein the noise levels depend on the
channel realizations in the CSR. Specifically, node-1 observes {h12(l), h13(l)}, which are perturbed by
estimation errors. In contrast, node-2 observes h12(l) under estimation error, however, it observes h13(l)
under both estimation error and the recovery noise during phase 4. Similarly, node-3 has h13(l), which
is perturbed by estimation error, whereas it has h12(l), which is perturbed by both estimation error and
the recovery noise during Phase 4.
In terms of leakage, an external eavesdropper receives the following symbols in the four phases:
y
(1)
E (l) = h1E(l) + n
(1)
E (l), y
(2)
E (l) = h2E(l) + n
(2)
E (l),
y
(3)
E (l) = h3E(l) + n
(3)
E (l), y
(4)
E (l) = h1E(l)(θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)) + n
(4)
E (l),
where hjE is the complex channel between node-j for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and the eavesdropper, and n(k)E (l) is
the AWGN at the eavesdropper in Phase k for k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note that the eavesdropper cannot learn
the channel realizations {h12(l), h13(l)} during the first three phases by the virtue of its physical location
(with the assumption that h1E(l), h2E(l), h3E(l) are statistically independent of h12(l) and h13(l)). In
Phase 4, it is straightforward to verify that the CSR is not confidential since I(θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l); θ
(2)
1 (l)) is
non-zero. In summary, this GSK protocol introduces asymmetry in the noise levels in the CSR at different
users and also incurs the non-zero leakage to the eavesdropper.
III. GROUP SECRET-KEY GENERATION WITH QUANTIZATION
In this section, we discuss some practical aspects of group secret-key generation protocols. In Section
II-A, the first three phases involve broadcast of pilot symbols, wherein the receiver nodes estimate the
corresponding channels using an appropriate channel estimation algorithm. However, in Phase 4, the sum
of the two channel realizations, i.e., θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l), is transmitted by node-1. Observe that the in-phase
and the quadrature components of θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) can be irrational, and as a result, there will be loss
of precision when the transmission module of the radio devices are implemented with limited hardware.
Furthermore, most practical radios are designed to transmit baseband signals from finite constellations
such as Phase Shift Keying (PSK), Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) etc. Due to such constraints,
node-1 would need to transmit a quantized version of the sum θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l), given by
ϕ(θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)) = θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) + zsum(l),
9where ϕ(·) is an appropriate quantization algorithm that directly quantizes the channel estimates to points
in a complex constellation, denoted by A, and zsum(l) is the corresponding quantization noise. After
transmitting the quantized version, the received symbols at node-2 and node-3 are given by
θ42(l) = h12(l)
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) + zsum(l)
)
+ n
(4)
2 (l)
and
θ43(l) = h13(l)
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) + zsum(l)
)
+ n
(4)
3 (l).
Using the above received symbols, the channel realizations recovered at node-2 and node-3 are corrupted
by the quantization noise in addition to the existing noise in Phase 4. However, in contrast, node-1 views
the channel realizations only under the channel estimation errors. Thus, with quantization at node-1,
the common randomness across the three nodes are affected by different levels of noise. We refer to
the above GSK protocol as Asymmetric Quantized GSK (AQGSK). It is straightforward to verify that
θ
(2)
1 (l)+ θ
(3)
1 (l)+ zsum(l) continues to leak θ
(2)
1 (l) or θ
(3)
1 (l) at the eavesdropper since I(θ
(2)
1 (l)+ θ
(3)
1 (l)+
zsum(l); θ
(2)
1 (l)) > 0. Although practical, AQGSK continues to suffer from disparity in the effective noise
levels at the three nodes. Therefore, we explore new GSK techniques that will help the three nodes increase
the key-rate, and yet enable the facilitator (node-1) to transmit symbols from a finite constellation.
IV. SYMMETRICALLY QUANTIZED GSK (SQGSK)
The quantization noise zsum(l) that arises by quantizing the sum θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) results in significant
noise in the CSR at some of the nodes especially when A is small in size. In order to improve the CSR
across the three nodes, a straightforward method is to apply quantization on the CSR at the three nodes so
that the quantization noise across the nodes are grossly at the same level. However, a disadvantage with
such an idea is asymmetry in the statistics of the quantization noise across the three nodes. To elaborate
further, while θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l) is quantized at node-1, the noisy version θ
(1)
2 (l) would be quantized at
node-2. This way, the statistical distribution of the quantization errors are not identical, which in turn
reduces the mutual information across the CSR at the three nodes. To address this issue, we explore an
alternate option of individually quantizing θ
(2)
1 (l) and θ
(3)
1 (l), and then adding their quantized versions at
node-1. In such a case, zsum(l) will be the sum of the quantization errors of θ
(2)
1 (l) and θ
(3)
1 (l). We refer to
this version of AQGSK as AQGSK-II, and refer to the former idea of quantizing the sum θ
(2)
1 (l)+ θ
(3)
1 (l)
(as given in Section III) as AQGSK-I. In the next subsection, we propose a protocol, referred to as
Symmetrically Quantized GSK (SQGSK) which reduces the disparity in the noise levels among the CSR
at the three nodes.
10
A. Basic Idea
The basic idea behind our strategy is to ensure that the quantization noise at the three nodes are
correlated so as to increase the common randomness. Towards that end, we propose the following changes
in Phase 4, and use the zero-noise scenario to explain the benefits, i.e., by keeping σ2 = 0 and γ = 0.
Without additive noise, the channel estimates across the three nodes would be identical, i.e., θ
(1)
2 (l) =
θ
(2)
1 (l) = h12(l), θ
(1)
3 (l) = θ
(3)
1 (l) = h13(l), and θ
(2)
3 (l) = θ
(3)
2 (l) = h23(l). As a result, during Phase
4 of each coherence-block, node-1 quantizes the channels h12(l) and h13(l) individually, and then adds
their quantized versions as h12(l)+ z12(l)+h13(l)+ z13(l), where z12(l) and z13(l) are the corresponding
quantization errors of h12(l) and h13(l), respectively. Due to this operation, the transmitted symbol from
node-1 takes values from the set A
⊕
A ⊂ C, which is still a finite constellation. The received baseband
signals at node-2 and node-3 in Phase 4 are given by
θ
(4)
2 (l) = h12(l) (h12(l) + h13(l) + z13(l) + z12(l)) and (7)
θ
(4)
3 (l) = h13(l) (h12(l) + h13(l) + z13(l) + z12(l)) . (8)
From Phase 1, node-2 has perfect knowledge of h12(l). Using that in (7), node-2 will recover h12(l) +
h13(l)+z13(l)+z12(l), and then subtract it by the quantized version of h12(l), i.e., h12(l)+z12(l), thereby
completely canceling the quantization noise z12(l). Similarly, node-3 will subtract the quantized version
of h13(l) from h12(l)+h13(l)+z13(l)+z12(l), thereby completely canceling the quantization noise z13(l).
After the above operations, it is straightforward to observe that the CSR observed at the three nodes is
{h12(l) + z12(l), h13(l) + z13(l)}. Taking insights from the above discussion, we elaborate on different
phases of the SQGSK protocol in the next section.
B. SQGSK Protocol
To start with, the three nodes agree upon a finite complex constellationA ⊂ C, given by A = AI
⊕
iAQ
such that AI = AQ. The proposed protocol comprises of four phases as described below:
Phase 1: node-1 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-2 and node-3 to estimate
the channels h12(l) and h13(l), respectively. Further, these values are quantized to the values in the
constellation A as
θ
(1)
2 (l) = ϕ(h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)), θ
(1)
3 (l) = ϕ(h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l)),
where ϕ(·) is the quantization operator that works independently on the in-phase and the quadrature
components by mapping them to the nearest points in AX for X ∈ {I, Q}. Specifically, for x ∼ N(0,Σ),
we have
ϕ(x) = argmina∈AI |x− a|2. (9)
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Phase 2: node-2 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-1 and node-3 to estimate and
then quantize the channels h12(l) and h23(l), respectively as
θ
(2)
1 (l) = ϕ(h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l)), θ
(2)
3 (l) = ϕ(h23(l) + e
(2)
3 (l)).
Phase 3: node-3 transmits a pilot symbol x = 1, which is used by node-1 and node-2 to estimate
the channels h13(l) and h23(l), respectively. Further, these values are quantized to the values in the
constellation A as
θ
(3)
1 (l) = ϕ(h13(l) + e
(3)
3 (l)), θ
(3)
2 (l) = ϕ(h23(l) + e
(3)
2 (l)).
Phase 4: In the last phase, node-1 transmits the sum θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l), using which node-2 and node-3
receive
θ
(4)
2 (l) = h12(l)(θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)) + n
(4)
2 (l),
and
θ
(4)
3 (l) = h13(l)(θ
(2)
1 (l) + θ
(3)
1 (l)) + n
(4)
3 (l),
respectively. Since node-2 has the knowledge of both h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l) and ϕ(h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)), it recovers
a noisy version of ϕ(h13(l)) by first applying a zero-forcing equalizer and subsequently canceling the
quantized version as
θ¯42(l) =
(
h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)
)−1
θ
(4)
2 (l)− ϕ
(
h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)
)
. (10)
Similarly, node-3 obtains a noisy version of ϕ(h12(l)) as
θ¯43(l) =
(
h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l)
)−1
θ
(4)
3 (l)− ϕ
(
h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l)
)
. (11)
Thus, the CSR seen by node-1, node-2 and node-3 are{
ϕ
(
h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l)
)
, ϕ
(
h13(l) + e
(3)
1 (l)
)}
,{
ϕ
(
h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)
)
, θ¯42(l)
}
and
{
θ¯43(l), ϕ
(
h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l)
)}
,
respectively, where θ¯42(l) and θ¯
4
3(l) are as given in (10) and (11).
With respect to the channel h12(l), it is clear that the common randomness is hampered by that of
node-3 due to the recovery noise in Phase 4. Similarly, the common randomness from the channel h13(l)
is hampered by that of node-2 due to recovery noise in Phase 4.
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C. Secret-Key Rate of the SQGSK Protocol
In this section, we show that the key-rate with SQGSK is higher than the AQGSK-II protocol under
the scenario when the channel estimates at all the nodes are assumed to be perfect in the first three
phases. The objective here is to bring out the difference between SQGSK and AQGSK-II during Phase
4, which mainly caters to recovering the channel estimates of the adjacent channels. We have chosen
AGQSK-II as the relevant baseline to compare the key-rate of SQGSK as both protocols use the same
constellation A
⊕
A to transmit the baseband symbols by the facilitator, node-1. In contrast, comparison
with AQGSK-I is not fair given that the facilitator uses A for transmitting baseband symbols in Phase 4.
Proposition 1: With perfect channel estimates in the first three phases, the key-rate offered by SQGSK
protocol is higher than the AQGSK-II protocol.
Proof: With perfect estimates of the direct channels, γ = 0 will apply in the first three phases. Since
we are addressing the impact of the recovery noise in Phase 4, we only consider the recovery process
of h12(l) at node-3. A similar argument is also applicable for recovering h13(l) at node-2, and hence we
omit that case. In the rest of this proof, we discard the reference to index l. The channel h12 goes through
the following modifications:
h12 → h12 + z12 → h12 + z12 + z13 → h12 + z12 + z13 + h−113 n(4)3 ,
where the first modification is at node-1, the next is after subtracting h12 at node-3, and the final one is
the effect of the additive noise at node-3. Due to Markov-chain property on the above sequence, we have
the upper bound in (12), given by
I
(
h12; h12 + z12 + z13 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
≤ I
(
h12 + z12; h12 + z12 + z13 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
. (12)
Furthermore, the Markov chain
h12 + z12 → h12 + z12 + z13 → h12 + z12 + z13 + h−113 n(4)3
can be re-written as
h12 + z12 → h12 + z12 + h−113 n(4)3 → h12 + z12 + h−113 n(4)3 + z13.
Thus, we have the inequality in (13), given by
I
(
h12 + z12; h12 + z12 + z13 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
≤ I
(
h12 + z12; h12 + z12 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
. (13)
Finally, we have (14), given by
I
(
h12; h12 + z12 + z13 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
≤ I
(
h12 + z12; h12 + z12 + h
−1
13 n
(4)
3
)
. (14)
by combining (12) and (13). Using (1), we highlight that the mutual information given on the right hand
side of (14) dictates the key-rate generated by the SQGSK protocol.
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D. Confidentiality of the CSR in SQGSK protocol
With the use of finite constellation, the noisy version of the CSR witnessed at node-1 takes values
from A. Due to this discrete nature, an external eavesdropper, although unable to directly witness the
CSR {h12(l), h13(l)}, can construct several candidates for h12(l) and h13(l) by listening to the symbol
transmitted by node-1 in Phase 4. Specifically, the number of such candidates depends on the received
value θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l); this is because, more than two pairs from A × A may result in the same value in
A
⊕
A [24]. In the rest of this section, we present leakage analysis at the eavesdropper assuming that
she has no additive noise, thereby capturing worst-case leakage.
Theorem 1: With regular M-QAM constellation as A, we have I(θ21(l); θ
2
1(l) + θ
3
1(l)) > 0, where
θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l) is the symbol transmitted by node-1 in Phase 4 of the SQGSK protocol.
Proof: In Phase 4 of the coherence-block l, the received symbol at the eavesdropper is given by
y
(4)
E (l) = h1E(l)
(
θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l)
)
+ n
(4)
E (l),
where h1E(l) is the complex channel between node-1 and the eavesdropper, and n
(4)
E (l) ∼ CN(0,Ω) is the
AWGN noise at the eavesdropper. We assume the worst-case scenario that Ω = 0, and also assume that
the eavesdropper perfectly knows the channel h1E . As a result, the eavesdropper can perfectly recover
the transmitted point θ21(l)+ θ
3
1(l) ∈ A
⊕
A. We prove the theorem statement by contradiction. Suppose,
I(θ21(l); θ
2
1(l) + θ
3
1(l)) = 0. This implies that H(θ
2
1(l) | θ21(l) + θ31(l) = θ(l)) = H(θ21(l)) with |A| mass
points on the conditional PMF P (θ21(l) | θ21(l) + θ31(l) = θ(l)), for every θ(l) ∈ A
⊕
A. However,
with any regular M-QAM constellation, it is straightforward to pick a point in θ(l) ∈ A⊕A such that
P (θ21(l) | θ21(l) + θ31(l) = θ(l)) is one, and this is a contradiction. This completes the proof.
We attempt to fix the above limitation of the SQGSK protocol by introducing the following mod-
ifications: In Phase 4 of each coherence-block, node-1 transmits 0 when θ21(l) and θ
3
1(l) are uniquely
recoverable from θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l); this case corresponds to the scenario when θ
2
1(l) and θ
3
1(l) are identical,
and take points that have maximum energy in M-QAM. In order to help node-2 and node-3 distinguish
this from the other cases where θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l) = 0, in the consensus phase of the SQGSK protocol,
node-1 discards all those index values which correspond to the coherence-blocks when θ21(l) and θ
3
1(l)
are uniquely recoverable from θ21(l) + θ
3
1(l). We refer to this version of the SQGSK protocol as the
optimized SQGSK protocol. To quantify the leakage associated with the SQGSK protocols, we define
residual entropy η at the eavesdropper as
η =
H(θ21(l) | θ21(l) + θ31(l))
H(θ21(l))
× 100.
In Fig. 3, we plot η for both SQGSK and optimized SQGSK with 4-, 16- and 64-QAM. To study the
leakage effect, we also scale the QAM constellations by using a scale factor α, because shrinking or
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Fig. 3. Leakage associated with SQGSK and optimized SQGSK when used along with 4-, 16- and 64-QAM.
enlarging A changes H(θ21(l)); this is attributed to the fact that the distribution of h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l) is
fixed. We observe that with α > 1, the effective constellation A
α
shrinks, and as a result dropping the
uniquely recoverable points increases the residual entropy at the eavesdropper. However, on the other
hand, with α = 1, the residual entropy of optimized SQGSK approximately matches that of SQGSK
since the probability associated with the uniquely recoverable points vanishes to zero. Fig. 3 shows that
the benefits of optimized SQGSK is significant (from 50% to 75%) with 4-QAM since the probability
associated with the uniquely recoverable points is non-negligible. However, as the size of the constellation
grows from 16-QAM to 64-QAM, the benefits of optimized SQGSK reduce. Overall, despite diminishing
returns of optimized SQGSK over the SQGSK protocol, the plots in Fig. 3 show that SQGSK protocols
incur significant leakage of the CSR.
V. ALGEBRAIC SQGSK PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a new practical GSK protocol which compensates the leakage drawbacks
of SQGSK. The central idea behind this method is to avoid transmitting symbols in A
⊕
A. Instead,
the quantized values θ21(l) and θ
3
1(l) at node-1 are appropriately transformed to points in an algebraic
ring, and are then added in the ring. Subsequently, the outcome of the addition operation in the ring is
mapped back to a point in A before transmission. For example, see Fig. 4 which captures this idea when
using 16-QAM as A. We refer to this method as the Algebraic SQGSK protocol. Since the transmitted
baseband symbol by node-1 belongs to A, we consider AQGSK-I as the relevant baseline to this protocol.
The specific ingredients needed for the Algebraic SQGSK protocol are given below.
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Fig. 4. Depiction of algebraic operations by translating the regular 2m-QAM constellation to Z
2
m
2
[i] with m = 4.
A. Ingredients
A regular 2m-QAM constellation A, where m is even, given by
A = AI
⊕
iAQ,
such that AI = AQ = {−2m2 + 1,−2m2 + 3, . . . , 2m2 − 3, 2m2 − 1}, can be written as a scaled and shifted
version of the constellation A¯ = {0, 1, . . . , 2m2 −1}⊕{0, i, . . . , i(2m2 −1)}, where i = √−1. In particular,
A¯ forms an algebraic ring Z
2
m
2
[i], defined over regular addition and multiplication, however, with modulo
2
m
2 operation on both the in-phase and the quadrature components. We represent the transformation from
A to A¯ by φ : A→ A¯, where
φ(x) =
x+ 2
m
2 − 1 + i(2m2 − 1)
2
, (15)
for x ∈ A.
Proposition 2: The transformation φ in (15) is one-one.
Proposition 3: The constellation A¯ forms a commutative group under addition, where addition of
x, y ∈ A¯ is defined as
x+ y = ((I(x) + I(y)) mod 2
m
2 ) + i((Q(x) + Q(y)) mod 2
m
2 ),
such that I(x) and Q(x) denote the in-phase and quadrature components of the complex number x, and
I(y) and Q(y) denote the in-phase and quadrature components of the complex number y.
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Example 1: For the 16-QAM constellation as shown in Fig. 4, the transformation φ : A→ A¯ is given
by φ(x) = x
2
+ 1.5 + 1.5i for x ∈ A.
In the next subsection, we use the transformation φ in Phase 4 of the SQGSK protocol to obtain the
Algebraic SQGSK scheme.
B. Algebraic SQGSK Protocol
Similar to the SQGSK protocol, the three nodes agree upon a regular M-QAM for A, where M = 2m
such that m is even. Furthermore, the first three phases are identical to that of SQGSK protocol, and
therefore we only explain the last phase.
Phase 4: In the last phase, node-1 applies the transformation φ(·) on θ(2)1 (l) and θ(3)1 (l) to obtain
φ(θ
(2)
1 (l)) ∈ A¯ and φ(θ(3)1 (l)) ∈ A¯, respectively. Subsequently, node-1 computes
θsum(l) = φ(θ
(2)
1 (l))⊕ φ(θ(3)1 (l)) ∈ A¯,
where the addition operator ⊕ is over the ring Z
2
m
2
[i], and then it broadcasts θ(l) , φ−1(θsum(l)) ∈ A
to node-2 and node-3. Here φ−1(·) denotes the inverse of the transformation φ. With this, the received
symbols at node-2 and node-3 are given by θ
(4)
2 (l) = h12(l)θ(l)+n
(4)
2 (l), and θ
(4)
3 (l) = h13(l)θ(l)+n
(4)
3 (l),
respectively. Since node-2 has the knowledge of both h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l) and ϕ(h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)), it obtains
an estimate θˆ2(l) using the MAP decoder
2 given by
θˆ2(l) = argmaxaj∈A
(
e−
|θ
(4)
2 (l)−(h12(l)+e
(1)
2 (l))aj |
2
σ2 P (θ(l) = aj)
)
, (16)
where P (θ(l) = aj) is the probability that the random variable θ(l) takes the value aj ∈ A. Using the
above estimate, node-2 obtains an estimate of the quantized version of h13(l) as
θ¯42(l) = φ
−1
(
φ(θˆ2(l))⊖ φ(ϕ(h12(l) + e(1)2 (l)))
)
, (17)
where the subtraction ⊖ is over the ring Z
2
m
2
[i]. Similarly, node-3 obtains an estimate of the quantized
version of h12(l) as
θ¯43(l) = φ
−1
(
φ(θˆ3(l))⊖ φ(ϕ(h13(l) + e(1)3 (l)))
)
, (18)
where
θˆ3(l) = argmaxaj∈A
(
e−
|θ
(4)
3
(l)−(h13(l)+e
(1)
3
(l))aj |
2
σ2 P (θ(l) = aj)
)
,
Thus, the CSR seen by node-1, node-2 and node-3 are{
ϕ
(
h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l)
)
, ϕ
(
h13(l) + e
(3)
1 (l)
)}
,
2Since the probability mass function on the points in the constellation A is not uniform, maximum likelihood (ML) decoder is not optimal
in this case.
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{
ϕ
(
h12(l) + e
(1)
2 (l)
)
, θ¯42(l)
}
, and
{
θ¯43(l), ϕ
(
h13(l) + e
(1)
3 (l)
)}
,
respectively, where θ¯42(l) and θ¯
4
3(l) are as given in (17) and (18). Unlike SQGSK, the CSR witnessed at
the three nodes belong to the constellation A.
C. Key-Rate Comparison with AQGSK-I
In order to capture the effect of quantization noise, we compare Algebraic SQGSK and AQGSK-I with
no additive noise. With no additive noise, i.e., when σ2 = 0 and γ = 0, it is straightforward to verify that
the CSR at the three nodes in Algebraic SQGSK protocol will be {h12(l) + z1(l), h13(l) + z2(l)}, where
z1(1) and z2(l) are the quantization errors corresponding to h12(l) and h13(l), respectively. By applying
the information-theoretic result in (1), the secret-key rate when using h12(l) as the CSR is determined by
KA−SQGSK =
1
4
H(h12(l) + z1(l)), (19)
where KA−SQGSK can be numerically computed using the PMF on the discrete random variable h12(l)+
z1(l) ∈ A. Specifically, since h12(l) is a complex Gaussian random variable, the PMF on h12(l) + z1(l)
can be computed using standard Q(·) function, where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
t=x
exp(− t2
2
)dt. In contrast, under
the same scenario, when using AQGSK-I the CSR at node-1, node-2 and node-3 are {h12(l), h13(l)} ,
{h12(l), h13(l) + zsum(l)} , and {h12(l) + zsum(l), h13(l)} , respectively, where zsum(l) is the quantization
noise resulting from quantizing the sum h12(l)+h13(l) to a point in A by node-1. In this case, by applying
(1), the secret-key rate KAQGSK−I when using h12(l) is given by
1
4
min(H(h12(l)), I(h12(l); h12(l) + zsum(l) | h13(l)))
=
1
4
I(h12(l); h12(l) + zsum(l) | h13(l)), (20)
where the equality is applicable because h12(l) is a continuous random variable. Furthermore, we have
KAQGSK−I ≤ 1
4
H(h12(l) + zsum(l) | h13(l))
=
1
4
H(h12(l) + h13(l) + zsum(l) | h13(l)), (21)
where the equality follows from the identity that differential entropy is invariant to translation of the
random variable by a constant. Note that the conditional entropy H(h12(l)+h13(l)+zsum(l) | h13(l)) can
be numerically evaluated by using the conditional PMF on the discrete random variable h12(l)+h13(l)+
zsum ∈ A. We now show through numerical evaluation that the key-rate offered by KA−SQGSK is higher
than KAQGSK−I. In Fig. 5, we use 4-QAM, 16-QAM, and 64-QAM as A to compare KA−SQGSK in
(19) and the upper bound on KAQGSK−I given in (21) by keeping the average transmit power at node-1
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identical between the two schemes. The plots in Fig. 5 show that the Algebraic SQGSK outperforms
AQGSK-I when σ2 = 0.
We caution the reader that the no additive-noise scenario is used to capture the effect of quantization
noise. However, in Section VI, we use extensive simulation results to show that the Algebraic-SQGSK
continues to outperform AQGSK-I when σ2 6= 0 and γ 6= 0.
Fig. 5. Comparison between the key-rate of Algebraic SQGSK in (19) and the upper bound on the key-rate of AQGSK-I in (21) under
no additive-noise scenario. We have omitted the scalar 1
4
from (19) and (21) when plotting the above figure. For a fair comparison, the
average transmit power at node-1 in Phase 4 is held constant between the two schemes. The plots show that Algebraic SQGSK outperforms
AQGSK-I.
D. Confidentiality of the CSR in Algebraic SQGSK
In this section, we prove that the Algebraic SQGSK protocol does not leak the CSR to an external
eavesdropper.
Theorem 2: With regular 2m-QAM constellation, we have I
(
θ
(2)
1 (l); θ(l)
)
= 0, where θ(l) is the
symbol transmitted by node-1 in Phase 4 of the Algebraic SQGSK protocol.
Proof: In Phase 4 of the coherence-block l, the received symbol at the eavesdropper is given by
y
(4)
E (l) = h1E(l) (θ(l)) + n
(4)
E (l),
where h1E(l) is the complex channel between node-1 and the eavesdropper, and n
(4)
E (l) ∼ CN(0,Ω) is
the AWGN noise at the eavesdropper. In this leakage analysis, we assume the worst-case scenario that
Ω = 0, and also assume that the eavesdropper perfectly knows the channel h1E(l) (using Phase 1 of the
protocol). As a result, the eavesdropper can perfectly recover the transmitted point θ(l) ∈ A by node-1.
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TABLE I
AN EXHAUSTIVE COMPARISON OF VARIOUS PRACTICAL GSK GENERATION PROTOCOLS
Parameters AQGSK-I AQGSK-II SQGSK Algebraic SQGSK
Nature of the CSR h12 at node-1 continuous continuous discrete discrete
Nature of the CSR h12 at node-2 continuous continuous discrete discrete
Nature of the CSR h12 at node-3 continuous continuous continuous discrete
Nature of the CSR h13 at node-1 continuous continuous discrete discrete
Nature of the CSR h13 at node-2 continuous continuous continuous discrete
Nature of the CSR h13 at node-3 continuous continuous discrete discrete
Transmitted constellation at node-1 A A
⊕
A A
⊕
A A
Leakage non-zero non-zero non-zero zero
Key-rate low low higher than AQGSK-II higher than AQGSK-I
We now analyze the conditional entropy H(θ21(l) | θ(l)), which quantifies the residual entropy at the
eavesdropper. Formally, we have
H(θ
(2)
1 (l) | θ(l)) = −
M∑
j=1
H(θ21(l) | θ(l) = cj)P (θ(l) = cj),
where P (θ(l) = cj) is the probability that the random variable θ(l) takes the realization cj ∈ A, and
H(θ21(l) | θ(l) = cj) is given by
H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) | θ(l) = cj
)
= −
M∑
k=1
P
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) = bk | θ(l) = cj
)
log2
(
P
(
θ21(l) = bk | θ(l) = cj
))
, (22)
where P
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) = bk | θ(l) = cj
)
is the conditional probability that the random variable θ
(2)
1 (l) takes
the realization bk ∈ A conditioned that θ(l) = cj . We immediately note that
P
(
θ21(l) = bk | θ(l) = cj
)
= P
(
θ31(l) = φ
−1(φ(cj)⊖ φ(bk))
)
where the subtraction operator ⊖ is over the ring Z
2
m
2
[i]. Since cj is fixed, the symbol φ
−1(φ(cj)⊖φ(bk))
results in a distinct value of A for each value of bk. Therefore, we have the equality
H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) | θ(l) = cj
)
= H
(
θ
(3)
1 (l)
)
,
and thus we have
H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) | θ(l)
)
= H
(
θ
(3)
1 (l)
)
.
Since h12(l) + e
2
1(l) and h13(l) + e
3
1(l) are identically distributed, we have H
(
θ
(3)
1 (l)
)
= H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l)
)
,
and therefore, we have H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l) | θ(l)
)
= H
(
θ
(2)
1 (l)
)
. This completes the proof.
20
Fig. 6. Key-rate comparison between AQGSK-II and SQGSK against various SNR values and complex constellations. The excursion-length
and the threshold levels of the key generation algorithm are varied to keep the same bit-error-rate for AQGSK-II and SQGSK. To generate
the above results, BER was held at 5%, 2% and 1% at 10 dB, 20 dB and 30 dB, respectively.
The above theorem has shown that Algebraic SQGSK does not leak the CSR to an external eavesdrop-
per, thereby fixing the drawback of the SQGSK protocol. Overall, to summarize the differences between
the proposed protocols, Table I provides an exhaustive comparison of the nature of CSR observed when
using the practical GSK generation protocols.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH SQGSK PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed protocols
in terms of key-rate, which is defined as the average number of secret bits generated per coherence-block.
To generate the results, we apply both SQGSK and Algebraic SQGSK protocols in conjunction with the
well known level-crossing algorithm [1]. The signal model for the three-node network is as described
in Section II. In the first three phases of the protocol, all the nodes use the received symbols as the
noisy estimates of the channel realizations, i.e., γ = σ2. The constellation A ⊂ C used in the simulations
are regular 4-QAM, 16-QAM and 64-QAM. We use L = 1000 coherence-blocks, after which each node
generates 4000 real samples as input to the key generation algorithm. Out of the 4000 samples, the first
2000 correspond to the in-phase and quadrature components of {h12(l) | 1 ≤ l ≤ 1000} arranged as
{I(h12(1)),Q(h12(1)), . . . , I(h12(1000)),Q(h12(1000))},
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Fig. 7. Key-rate comparison between AQGSK-I and Algebraic SQGSK against various SNR values and M -QAM constellations. The
excursion-length and the threshold levels of the key generation algorithm are varied to keep the same bit-error-rate for AQGSK-I and
Algebraic SQGSK. To generate the above results, BER was held at 5%, 2% and 1% at 10 dB, 20 dB and 30 dB, respectively.
where I(x) and Q(x) denote the in-phase and quadrature component of a complex number x, respectively.
Similarly, the other half corresponds to the in-phase and quadrature components of {h13(l) | 1 ≤ l ≤
1000}. Since the effective noise experienced by the three nodes are at different levels, each node deploys
the level-crossing algorithm by choosing the threshold levels as a function of its effective noise.
An important component of the key generation algorithm is the consensus phase, which happens over
the public channel. The order of exchanging information for consensus depends on the channel realization
in our protocol. With respect to {h12(l)}, node-1 first generates the index values of samples that represent
the center of excursions, and then broadcasts them. Subsequently, node-2 picks a subset of those index
values which also abides by the excursion length, and then broadcasts the shortlisted index values. Since
node-3 is the weakest in terms of the effective noise, it finalizes the list of index values based on the its
samples, and broadcasts the list of final index values. In the end, each node generates a binary secret-
key by quantizing the samples on the final list of index values. The consensus protocol for the channel
realizations {h13(l)} is similar to that of {h12(l)}, however, this time the consensus order is node-1 →
node-3 → node-2, since node-2 is the weakest in the terms of the effective noise. By the end of the
consensus phase, it is possible that the digital keys generated at the three nodes differ in few locations,
and this results in errors in the group secret-key.
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A. Baselines and Results
With the above ingredients, the key-rate of the SQGSK protocol and the Algebraic SQGSK protocol
are presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. Here, key-rate is computed by dividing the length of the
generated key by L = 1000. In Fig. 6, the key-rate of the SQGSK protocol is compared with AQGSK-II,
wherein h12(l)+ e
(2)
1 (l) and h13(l)+ e
(3)
1 (l) are separately quantized to symbols in A, and are then added
before the transmission. Similarly, in Fig. 7, the key-rate of the Algebraic SQGSK protocol is compared
with AQGSK-I, wherein the sum h12(l) + e
(2)
1 (l) + h13(l) + e
(3)
1 (l) is directly quantized to A. In both
AQGSK-I and AQGSK-II, only node-1 quantizes, while the other nodes use their noisy observation of
the CSR. When comparing AQGSK-I and Algebraic SQGSK, although points from A are transmitted
by node-1, the average transmit power in Phase 4 is not the same since the PMF on the points in A are
different. As a result, the constellations are appropriately scaled so that the average transmit powers in
phase 4 are identical. However, when comparing AQGSK-II and SQGSK, no normalization is required as
the average transmit powers are identical to start with. As discussed in Section IV-D, in both AQGSK-II
and SQGSK, node-1 discards the samples from coherence-blocks wherein the CSR are uniquely decodable
by an external eavesdropper.
We evaluate the key-rate of the above protocols for different SNR values (where SNR , 1
σ2
) against
a given bit-error-rate (BER). A bit is said to be in error if any two nodes disagree with the value at
that location. At each SNR value, the threshold values and the excursion length of the level-crossing
algorithm are varied to obtain the same BER for the schemes under comparison. The key-rate of the
proposed protocols are presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 for SNR = 10, 20, and 30 dB when used with 4-,
16-, and 64-QAM. The plots in Fig. 6 show that SQGSK outperforms its baseline AQGSK-I. Specifically,
the benefits are prominent for 4-QAM; this is because, with just two levels of quantization, cancellation
of quantized version of the channel is perfect in most cases during Phase 4. However, as the constellation
size increases, different nodes have different quantized versions of the channels due to estimation error,
and as a result cancellation at node-2 and node-3 are not perfect. Overall, despite diminishing benefits with
larger constellations, SQGSK outperforms AQGSK-II. With reference to the Algebraic SQGSK protocol,
Fig. 7 shows that Algebraic SQGSK yields higher key-rate than its baseline AQGSK-I. Specifically, the
benefits are prominent at 20 dB and 30 dB; this is because, at high SNR values, recovery of θ(l) in
Phase 4 is accurate in most cases, and as a result, cancellation of the quantized version of the channel
is perfect. However, at lower SNR values, different nodes have different quantized versions, and as a
result cancellation at node-2 and node-3 are not perfect. This inference is a generalization of the results
observed in Section V-C for σ2 = 0.
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Fig. 8. Depicting the difference between two-level quantization and multi-level quantization while computing excursions at each node. In
this example, the in-phase part of the symbols of 16-QAM constellation is used.
VII. KEY GENERATION WITH MULTI-LEVEL QUANTIZATION
In this section, we present simulation results on key-rate by using a multi-level quantization algorithm
in conjunction with the proposed SQGSK protocols. This approach, in contrast to the two-level algorithm
(applied in the previous section), can generate at most log2(
√
M) bits from a real sample in consensus,
where M = 2m, for some even m, denotes the size of A. Before presenting the results, we first explain
the idea behind multi-level quantization.
A. Multi-level Quantization
Recall that we have used regular square QAM constellations for A, which can be written as A =
AI
⊕
iAQ, where AI = AQ, each of size
√
M . Since the in-phase and the quadrature-phase components
of hjk(l) are independently quantized at each node, we only consider the in-phase components for this
discussion. Furthermore, we denote the elements of AI by an for 1 ≤ n ≤
√
M , and denote the spacing
between successive values by ∆, i.e., minn 6=n′|an − an′ | = ∆ for an, an′ ∈ AI . Around each value
an ∈ AI , we define a zone of width β(an) so as to neglect the values lying outside that zone. For
illustration purpose, we refer the readers to Fig. 8, which depicts the concept of zones for the in-phase
components of 16-QAM, wherein ∆ = 2. In this example, in order to quantize a real sample to the
symbol 1, the sample must lie between q and 2 − q, for some 0 < q < 0.5. Here, the parameter q
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is used to optimize the performance of the proposed algorithm. This implies that the zone size for the
points {−1, 1} is 2− 2q, which is depicted by the white patches in Fig. 8. Note that a real value will be
discarded when computing excursions if it lies in one of the blue patches. For the point with maximum
value in AI , i.e, an = 3, the real sample will be quantized to it if it lies anywhere above 2+ q. Similarly,
for the other extreme value −3, the samples that lie anywhere below −2 − q will be mapped to it. We
refer to this form of quantization as multi-level quantization.
B. Simulation Results
When using multi-level quantization, the nodes are said to be in consensus if the quantized versions
of the corresponding samples are in the same zone. In the case of SQGSK, with respect to the CSR
h13(l), the observation of h13(l) witnessed at node-2 is unquantized, and therefore, applying multi-level
quantization can either result in a discarded sample (by the virtue of the sample lying in a blue patch
as per Fig. 8) or a legitimate sample in the white patch of one of the
√
M levels. Unlike SQGSK
protocol, in the Algebraic SQGSK protocol, the recovery process at node-2 involves a sequence of MAP
decoding and successive cancellation, which in turn forces the samples to be in one of the
√
M zones.
As a result, the zone-concept in multi-level quantization is not directly applicable as the nodes decode
the observations to one of the
√
M levels. In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we present simulation results on
the key-rate with multi-level quantization by employing both SQGSK and Algebraic SQGSK protocols,
respectively. We have used 16- and 64-QAM at 20 dB and 30 dB to demonstrate the benefits of multi-level
quantization. Using each excursion in consensus, multi-level quantization generates 2- and 3-bits with
16- and 64-QAM, respectively. The bit-mapping from
√
M zones to log2(
√
M) bits is chosen such that
ones and zeros in the generated secret-key are equiprobable. The plots show that at 20 dB SNR, multi-
level quantization algorithm performs poorly when using 64-QAM; this is because the effective noise (a
combination of the recovery noise and channel estimation noise) at the nodes results in quantizing their
samples to different levels, thereby resulting in errors3. However, at 30 dB, the plots show that multi-level
quantization provides benefits, and this behavior follows our intuition that low variance of noise rarely
takes the samples outside quantization zones.
In summary, stitching together the advantages of two-level and multi-level quantization, we recommend
Algebraic SQGSK protocol along with the two-level crossing algorithm at low and moderate SNR values,
whereas we recommend Algebraic SQGSK protocol along with the multi-level quantization algorithm at
3We have observed that multi-level quantization performs poorer than two-level quantization at 10 dB SNR too, and hence we have
omitted those results
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high SNR values. Finally, between SQGSK and Algebraic SQGSK, we recommend the latter scheme due
to zero leakage of the CSR to an external eavesdropper.
Fig. 9. Key-rate using the SQGSK protocol with and without multi-level quantization algorithm. In the above figure, SQGSK and M-SQGSK
refer to two-level SQGSK and multi-level SQGSK, respectively. To generate the above results, BER was held at 5% and 1% at 20 dB and
30 dB, respectively.
Fig. 10. Key-rate using the Algebraic SQGSK protocol with and without multi-level quantization algorithm. In the above figure, A-SQGSK
and M-A-SQGSK refer to two-level Algebraic SQGSK and multi-level Algebraic SQGSK, respectively. To generate the above results, BER
was held at 2% and 1% at 20 dB and 30 dB, respectively.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We address physical-layer GSK generation in a wireless network wherein the nodes have the constraint
of transmitting baseband symbols from finite complex constellations. We proposed practical GSK proto-
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cols in a three-node wireless network, wherein in addition to the facilitator, the other nodes in the network
also quantize their channel estimates and then use them appropriately to improve the correlation among
the CSR. We first proposed the Symmetrically Quantized GSK protocol (SQGSK), which provided higher
key-rate in comparison with the traditional baselines. However, we also noticed that the leakage of the
CSR with SQGSK is significant. In order to circumvent the leakage issues in SQGSK, we proposed the
Algebraic SQGSK protocol, which guarantees zero-leakage to the eavesdropper and yet outperforms the
traditional AGSK-I protocol. We have provided extensive simulation results to showcase the benefits of
the proposed protocols. As a future direction of research, we intend to develop practical key generation
protocols for a wireless network with more than three nodes, and with varying topology.
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